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Reformulating an Argument of Aristotle’s 
against Contradictions
Aaron Guthrie
aristotle put forward a number of arguments against contradictions being true, in 
Metaphysics. However, many of them share a common flaw; the opponent in the debate 
(a dialetheist) can accept both the conclusion, and its negation. my aim will be to 
reformulate one argument, the anscombe/Cresswell argument, to eliminate this flaw. 
i do so by exploiting modern developments in dialethic theory. i turn the argument 
into a non-question-begging reductio by exploiting the fact that a reductio can be to 
absurdity but not contradiction, and can conclude in the rejection of what lead to it (in 
this case, a contradiction). i also respond to a number of other objections to this argu-
ment, exploring the possibility that there is a good argument that keeps to the spirit 
of the original. i conclude that there is such an argument, but one that is only about 
very specific contradictions.
1. Introduction
in Metaphysics aristotle put forward various arguments which conclude that all (or 
some) contradictions are not true. aristotle’s opponents in this debate did not have as 
developed a position as their modern counterparts. moreover, the tools for engaging 
in meaningful debate, given the particular subject matter, had not been developed. a 
major aim of this paper is to look at one argument given by aristotle in light of modern 
developments, and in doing so giving that argument a better chance of succeeding in 
showing something. as Priest (2006a:9–20) has pressed, many of the arguments that 
aristotle gives against the view that there are true contradictions (i.e. dialetheism) share 
a flaw; the conclusion can be accepted by a dialetheist if it is in the form ¬(a & ¬a). 
this is so because a dialetheist can accept both (a & ¬a) and ¬(a & ¬a); a contradic-
tion, but contradictions can be accepted by a dialetheist (see e.g. Priest, 2006a:19–20; 
Restall, 2004:81; Brady, 2004:41–42). this flaw seems to show that such arguments 
have uninteresting conclusions since the conclusion can be accepted by the opponent 
in the debate. But, i contend, in at least one argument the flaw is easily remedied by 
incorporating modern developments. 
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the argument i will examine is the “anscombe/Cresswell”1 argument, which i will 
reformulate in a simple way to avoid this flaw. i do the work of setting up the modern 
theory in section 2. this will allow me to reformulate the argument into a reductio 
ad absurdum (hereafter simply reductio), where the absurdity is not an absurdity qua 
contradiction. this will enable the argument to be a non-question-begging reductio, 
which concludes with the rejection of the assumption that lead to the absurdity; in 
this case the assumption will be a contradiction. this results in an argument without 
the above flaw, as a dialetheist cannot, under normal circumstances, accept and reject 
one and the same statement (Priest, 2006b:96–99). 
in section 3 i reformulate the anscombe/Cresswell argument. But beyond simply 
reformulating it to deal with the above flaw i also explore the possibility that there is 
a good argument here (or hereabouts). my method is to further reformulate the argu-
ment to deal with a number of objections put by Priest (2006a:26). as a first step, i 
note that aside from a reductio the argument can be considered a conditional proof, 
thus just showing something about some contradictions. i then go on to show how 
to reformulate the argument so as to not rely on the identity theory of predication. 
this move allows me to generalise the argument, which also allows me to deal with 
the objection that the argument relies on essentialism. i conclude that there is a 
good argument here, but that the argument concerns a specific sort of contradiction. 
2. Situating the debate within the modern context
the broad context of the debate concerns the law of non-contradiction (lnC). 
dialetheists reject lnC, while non-dialetheists accept it. But if the law is construed 
as accepting ¬(a & ¬a) for all a, then there is a problem; the dialetheist can also 
accept this (see e.g. Priest, 2006a:19–20; Restall, 2004:81; Brady, 2004:41–42). this 
commits them to a contradiction, but contradictions are not, qua contradiction, in 
conflict with a dialetheist position. this is not to say that a dialetheist should accept 
all contradictions. However, Priest (2006b:74–76) is one dialetheist who contends 
that this particular contradiction is true. this sort of dialetheist position is the one 
i will engage with, as it is in the best position to push the main objection of interest 
to this paper. 
the objection, put against a number of aristotle’s arguments, is that the conclu-
sion can be accepted by the opponent in the debate (Priest, 2006a:20ff.). this is so 
since a number of aristotle’s arguments conclude with a statement of the form ¬(a 
& ¬a), or a statement that is similarly problematic (e.g. ¬(a & ¬a)). But, as with 
the formulation of lnC above, a dialetheist can accept this and its negation. a way 
to deal with the problem in the lnC case is to formulate the law as the rejection of (a 
1 this interpretation of the argument can be found in anscombe and geach, 1967, in a chapter credited 
to anscombe, and was developed and formalised in Cresswell, 2003.
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& ¬a) for all a, rather than the acceptance of ¬(a & ¬a) for all a (Restall, 2004:81; 
Brady, 2004:44–47). similarly, i exploit this distinction in responding to this objection.
2.1. Rejection and negation
accept a, and you should reject ¬a, accept ¬a, and you should reject a, or so some 
might argue (grim, 2004:61–63; Weir, 2004:403). Priest (2006b:96–99) contends 
this account of rejection is wrong; one can rationally accept a statement and its 
negation. Priest (loc. cit.) further holds that if one accepts a statement, one need not 
reject the statement’s negation. Crucially, Priest (loc. cit.) contends that a dialetheist 
may employ rejection in the normal way, i.e. a dialetheist should not, at least under 
normal circumstances (but see Priest 2006a:109–110), both accept and reject one 
and the statement. this account has the virtue of allowing a polemic formulation 
of the law of non-contradiction, viz. as the rejection of (a & ¬a) for all a. similarly 
for the argument reconstruction that i do, the argument will change from one that 
concludes with the negation of a contradiction, to a reductio that ends in the rejec-
tion of a contradiction. 
2.2. Reductio arguments in this context
Reductio arguments, given that we should not be assuming that we should reject all 
contradictions, might be thought to beg the question (see e.g. lukasiewicz, 1979:57). 
Reductio arguments can work like this: assume a, from a deduce a contradiction, 
conclude ¬a. if the non-dialetheist is right, then contradictions are never ration-
ally acceptable, so deducing one means that you have deduced an absurdity (Priest, 
2006a:86). By “absurdity” here i simply mean something not rationally acceptable. 
moreover, that a entails an absurdity means you should reject a (Priest, 2006a:86). 
But in this context it cannot be assumed that contradictions are, ipso facto, absurdi-
ties, on pain of begging the question.
Priest (2006a:14), in fact, contends that some absurdities are worse than some 
contradictions; an example Priest (loc. cit.) gives is the belief “that i am a frog”. the 
non-dialetheist need not agree with Priest on this point. all the non-dialetheist needs 
to do is contend that some statements are not rationally acceptable for reasons other 
than being (or entailing) contradictions. for example, if from a reductio they deduce 
that 1 = 2, they need to point to that as being an absurdity, even if they think that the 
associated contradiction is worse.2 at this point one can give reasons that the pur-
ported absurdity is in fact an absurdity, as long as the reason is not the truth of the 
negation of the absurdity. using the above example, one may also argue that if 1 = 2, 
2 this is not to say that all non-dialetheists need think that if a is abusrd, ¬a is true. some may think 
that both a, ¬a are absurd in some cases (for instance, where a is the liar sentence). 
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all real numbers would be identical3 and that this is absurd. one may further argue 
that this would make mathematics useless, and claim that this is absurd. one may 
also neglect to give reasons, and simply contend that 1 = 2 is self-evidently absurd.4 
given this, it is possible to run a non-question-begging reductio as long as the 
absurdity is not an absurdity qua contradiction. if, from the assumption of a an absurd-
ity follows, then one still ought reject a (Priest, 2006b:104). an example of this can 
be found in the literature on aristotle’s arguments. Priest (2006a:24) interprets one 
of aristotle’s arguments as such a reductio:
(i) if “man” refers to the substance of man, it refers to one thing; (ii) hence if “man” and 
“not man” meant the same thing “man” would refer to the substance of “not man”; (iii) 
but the substances (meanings) of “man” and “not man” are different...hence “man” would 
refer to (at least) two things.
But then one thing could be two things, and this could reasonably be claimed 
an absurdity, and on those grounds rejected along with what lead to it, namely that 
“man” and “not man” mean the same (Priest, 2006a:24–25). Below i will note how 
the anscombe/Cresswell argument seems to have a similar first premise to this one, 
in so far as it relies on quantity.
3. The Anscombe/Cresswell argument
for the anscombe/Cresswell argument to be understandable, something needs to 
be said about the technical terms that appear in it, namely “signification”, and “sub-
stance” (dancy, 1975:106–108). aristotle’s notion of substance is subtle, complicated, 
and controversial (see e.g. Cohen, 2009). However, for my analysis of the argument 
it will suffice to give a simple gloss of aristotle’s account of substance. substances are 
the basic particulars of the world. they are to be identified with essences. they are 
things like man, tree, horse, and are properties that a thing has necessarily. they are 
to be distinguished from accidental properties, things like tall, bearded and so on, 
which are properties a thing has contingently.
With regards to signification it seems to me that the easiest way to explain it is via 
the distinction between types of signification. the two types being “signification of 
one” and “signification about” (Cresswell, 2003:181), which correspond to a what of 
predicating, and a way of predicating. the what in the former case corresponds to 
predicating substances, and the latter to predicating accidents (Kirwan, 1971:96–97). 
for the purposes of this paper the relevant notion is the “signification of one” type. 
in spelling out the way it predicates, i follow Priest’s (2006a:25–26) and Kirwan’s 
(1971:96–100) account, as it is a simple way to approach the text, and Priest is the 
3 see mortensen (2000:205) for dunn’s argument to this effect. 
4 it may also be rational to, in some cases, move from a being self evidently absurd, and thus rejecting 
it, to accepting ¬a. 
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one with whom i am engaging. on this account what aristotle means by “socrates 
is a man” is that socrates and man are the same thing (i.e. identical with each other) 
(Priest, 2006a:25–26; Kirwan, 1971:96–100). i will call this the “identity theory” of 
predication (Priest, 2006a:26).
With the preliminaries out of the way i can now introduce the anscombe/Cress-
well argument:
1. if f and g are both substance predicates, then if x is f, and x is g, f and g 
signify the same thing (they both signify x)
2. f and ¬f never signify the same thing 
3. so, no x is both f and ¬f (1,2 by modus tollens) 
(Cresswell, 2003:168; Priest, 2006a:25)
Premise 1 is justified by the identity theory of predication. if f and g are predicated 
as substances of x, they are identical to x. and if x is the same thing as f, and x is the 
same thing as g, then f is the same thing as g, by substitution of identicals. Priest 
(2006a:25–26) makes a few objections to this argument. i leave aside objections to the 
argument as a good interpretation of aristotle as i am interested in the argument on 
its own grounds. i respond in turn to the following objections: it is only an argument 
against some contradictions; the conclusion can be accepted by a dialetheist; the 
argument relies on a bad theory of predication; the argument relies on essentialism; 
f and ¬f are never both substance predicates according to aristotle. at the outset i 
concede that this argument only deals with some contradictions, not all, and as such 
will not refute dialetheism. However, as i argue below, it can still show something 
about some contradictions.
3.1. Reductio version of Anscombe/Cresswell
as Priest (2006a:26) points out, the conclusion seems to be ineffective, at least against 
some dialetheists; they can accept the conclusion of the anscombe/Cresswell argument, 
and accept its negation. i now implement my promise of turning the argument into 
a non-question-begging reductio: 
1. if f and g are both substance predicates, then if x is f, and x is g, f and g 
signify the same thing
2. ¬(no x is both f & ¬f) (assume for Raa)
3. some x is both f & ¬f (2)
4. f and ¬f can signify the same thing (1, 3 by modus ponens)
5. But 4 is an absurdity, so there is good reason to reject the statement that 
lead to it, namely ¬(no x is both f & ¬f)
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in the original form of the argument, accepting the conclusion, ¬(no x is both f & 
¬f), did not rule out accepting the ¬(no x is both f & ¬f). However in this form the 
conclusion is the rejection of ¬(no x is both f & ¬f), and this does rule out accepting 
that contradiction. and this reductio is not question-begging as there is no claim that 
4 is an absurdity because it entails a contradiction. Here the claim is just that 4 is an 
absurdity; it is an absurdity on its own merits. 
there are a number of possible moves here, such as, deny that 4 is an absurdity, 
or reject 1. my aim is not to delve into deeper questions about the argument, such as 
whether 4 is an absurdity. the important point for this paper is that the dialetheist 
doesn’t get to accept 4 for free, in the way they did in the original form of the argument. 
so putting this as an argument against (some) contradictions is not question-begging. 
moreover, even if such moves worked, the argument would still show something about 
some contradiction, viz. that 4 follows from said contradiction. so regardless of what 
we want to say about 4, the argument is still interesting; it is at least an argument that 
if a certain contradiction obtained, then something particular to that contradiction 
would follow. that is to say, one may consider it as a conditional proof argument, i.e. 
from the assumption of 3, 4 follows, so (3 → 4). in this case, from the assumption of 
2, 4 follows, so (2 → 4).
this method of turning an argument which is susceptible to Priest’s objection into 
a reductio which isn’t is quite simple, and so it might work for other arguments that 
face the same objection. the method is to simply take the premises of one of aristotle’s 
arguments, assume the negation of the conclusion (i.e. a contradiction), and then see 
if one can deduce an absurdity. 
3.2. Identity theory of predication
Priest (2006a:25–26) also objects that the argument relies on the identity theory of 
predication. However, it is possible to modify the argument so as to avoid commit-
ment to the identity theory of predication, whilst keeping to the spirit of the original 
argument: 
1d) ∀f∀x[fx → ∀g(gx → f=g)]5 (given that f and g are substance predi-
cates) (c.f. Russell, 1905:490)
What this says is that, for all f and all x, if any x is an f, and a g, then f and g are 
the same, which seems to be roughly the same as the original. But there is no com-
mitment here to the identity theory of predication. on that theory a predicate came 
5 other formalisations seem possible, for example, following noonan’s (1977:163) account of significa-
tion, one might plug in ∀x(fx≡gx) in place of (f=g). i don’t pursue this here, as noonan (1977:165) 
constructs this so as to allow substitution salva veritate, and this complicates things in the current 
context; as for any contradiction, it seems that a is substitutable salva vitate for ¬a (since both are 
true and false). 
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out as being identical with a subject (i.e. f being identical with x), but this argument 
is not committed to that claim.
at this point one might ask what justifies the first premise if it makes no appeal to 
the identity theory of predication.6 my response here is to point out that it applies to 
all objects that fall under a certain description, viz. things that take only one substance 
predicate. moreover, replace “substance predicate” by some other specification of a set 
of predicates, and then the new argument will apply to objects which take only one 
of those predicates. the argument could be about, for instance, things that have only 
one colour. note also that on this construal, the argument is similar to the argument 
about meanings given above. this is because the focus of the argument is on things 
that are only one thing qua a given set of predicates, and the meaning argument was 
about words which have only one meaning. this also dismantles the commitment to 
essentialism. However, the importance of the argument is a metaphysical and onto-
logical issue in the following sense; what things are only one thing (qua a given set of 
predicates) is a metaphysical and ontological issue. this is where an argument that 
there are things, such as substances, that can only be one thing qua a certain sort of 
predicate would make the argument metaphysically and ontologically more interest-
ing. and an argument that there are some metaphysically or ontologically interesting 
predicates would make the argument even more interesting. 
Returning to the formulation as a reductio, one can get the following argument (i 
assume here m,¬m are substance predicates, i leave discussion of this assumption to 
the next section of the paper):
1d) ∀f∀x[fx → ∀g(gx → f=g)] (given that f,g are substance predicates)
2d) ∀F¬(F=¬F) (a reformulation of premise 2 of Anscombe/Cresswell)
3d) (mx & ¬mx) (assume for Raa)
4d) (m=¬m) (1,3 modus ponens (with m, ¬m substituted for f and g respec-
tively in 1)) (absurdity)7 
further, we can then derive:
5d) ¬(m=¬m) (2 by instantiation)
6d) ¬(m=m) (4,5 by substitution) (c.f. irwan, 1991:183)
6 i owe this point to stephan Kubicki. 
7 i am assuming here that i can substitute in ¬m for either g, or f. this seems reasonable, given that the 
argument goes by way of saying, take one of these things (whether you want to call them predicates, or 
whatever), such as m,¬m and so on (and i formalize the variable form of those things as f, g), only 
one of them applies to x. 
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3.3. Substance predicates
Priest (2006a:26) also objects that, for any f, f and ¬f cannot both be substance 
predicates on aristotle’s account, and, Priest claims, both are needed to be for the 
argument to go through. the first point to make is that this is a criticism of the argu-
ment with regards to it showing anything about substances. But it could still work for 
some predicates if, instead of specifying aristotelian substances, some other predicates 
were specified which included for some f both f and ¬f, and all objects took only one 
of the specified predicates. so this again seems to be an issue with the metaphysical 
and ontological importance of the argument, which is not to say it is an unimportant 
issue. the second point to make is that instead of assuming just (fx & ¬fx), one 
can also assume that f and ¬f are both substance predicates, which will then be the 
assumption of a more complicated contradiction, but a contradiction nonetheless. 
thus what will end up being rejected will still be a contradiction. What we have ended 
up with, then, is an argument that can at least show that if all objects take only one 
of a given set of predicates, and those predicates include some which are such that 
both they and their negation are in the set, then for those predicates which include 
both they and their negation, if any object takes both predicates, identity fails. While 
this is an argument about a very specific sort of contradiction, it is a good argument 
which doesn’t suffer from any of the flaws claimed by Priest of the original, yet still 
keeps to the spirit of the original.
4. Conclusion
the major aim of this paper has been to show that it is possible to turn the anscombe/
Cresswell argument from one with a problematic conclusion, to one with a non-
problematic conclusion. i did so by turning it into a non-question-begging reductio, 
however i also noted that one could reconstruct the argument into an interesting 
conditional proof. i also explored the possibility that there was a good argument that 
didn’t stray too far from the anscombe/Cresswell argument. i did so by reformulating 
the argument so as to deal with a number of criticisms made by Priest. i concluded 
that there is a good argument, which keeps to the spirit of the original argument, to 
be found here.
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